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CAN CRIMINAL LAW BE CONTROLLED?
Darryl K. Brown*
OVERCRMi!NALIZAT!ON: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw. By Douglas
Husak. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 231.
$49.95.
INTRODUCTION
It is a bizarre state of affairs that criminal law has no coherent descrip-
tion or explanation. We have standard tropes to define criminal law, but they
obscure as much as they clarify and are honored in the breach as much as
the rule. Crimes, for instance, are defined by wrongdoing and culpability; to
be guilty, one must do a wrongful act in a blameworthy manner, that is, as a
responsible agent without excuse or justification. And crimes define public
wrongs, which are distinct from private wrongs. Further, we criminalize
only harmful conduct, or risk-creating conduct, or immoral conduct, or con-
duct the criminalization of which carries an expressive message of public
values. And criminal law's function is to prevent crime, or to achieve justice
through retribution, or both. But none of this gets us very far, either as a
matter of conceptual clarity or descriptive accuracy regarding our actual
collection of criminal laws. Lots of immoral and harmful conduct is not
criminal;' lots of harmless and morally neutral conduct is criminalized!2 The
concept of "harm" itself so eludes definition that it has been employed to
describe all manner of conduct with no tangible or emotional injury, no vic-
tim, and no significant risk creation.' Similarly with "wrongdoing." Core
cases are plain, but the line between public and private wrongs---crimes ver-
sus civil wrongs-has no widely shared definition, and no foundation
beyond shared intuition. And if one accepts an expressive function for
criminal law regardless of the harmfulness of the relevant conduct, the cate-
gory of "crimes" grows even larger. The standard assumption is that, to be
culpable for a crime, one must have a mental state that demonstrates knowl-
edge, awareness, or voluntary will regarding one's conduct and its possible
consequences. But crimes with no mental-state requirement abound.
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law and David H. Ibbeken Research Professor, University of
Virginia School of Law. My thanks to Doug Husak for his generous reactions to an earlier draft of
this Review and earlier discussions on related topics.
1. See, e.g., Leo Katz, Villainy and Felony: A Problem Concerning Criminalization, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 451 (2002).
2. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 47-49 (2007).
3. Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 109 (1999).
4. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGIS-
LATION 17-31 (2006), http://www.fed-soc.org/dolib/20070404-crimreportfmal.pdf (compiling a list
Michigan Law Review
The resulting incoherence is widely recognized. Without conceptual
boundaries such as criminalization solely of harmful, fault-based, culpable
conduct, criminal law can sprawl widely, defying theoretical description as
well as practical limits. The problem is not limited to the United States.
Take this description from an Australian: "Crime is not a unidimensional
construct. For this reason one should not be overly optimistic about a gen-
eral theory which sets out to explain all types of crime.' 5 Consider this from
a Briton: "The various definitions of crime ... lack coherence, they jostle
uncomfortably together, overlap, correspond, and contradict.' 6 An American
offers a comparable view: "American criminal law's historical development
has borne no relation to any plausible normative theory-unless 'more'
counts as a normative theory."7 The result is overcriminalization, complaints
of which are both widespread and long standing--one can find them at least
four decades ago, before the recent growth in federal criminal law.8 A
half-century ago, before recent overcriminalization complaints, a leading
Anglo-American criminal scholar concluded we can only define crimes self-
referentially as acts "capable of being followed by criminal proceedings,
having one of the types of outcome (punishment etc.) known to follow these
proceedings." 9 Which is to say, a crime is whatever a legislature says is a
crime.
How did this state of affairs come about? At one level, the answer is
straightforward: in the modem era, legislatures create crimes, and legisla-
tures do not abide by a consistent set of principles regarding what matters
are appropriate for criminalization. They employ criminal law purely in-
strumentally, as a tool for achieving whatever end majorities choose to
pursue. More interestingly, courts have never developed significant constitu-
tional doctrines for checking legislatures' crime-creation choices, even as
they developed a range of doctrines to review legislative action in any num-
ber of other topics, and in the process of regulating other topics-speech,
privacy rights, property and contract rights, rights to fair notice, weapons
possession-they have overturned hundreds of criminal laws. Perhaps most
surprising, however, is that criminal law theorists have given relatively little
attention, until quite recently, to theories of criminalization. If courts and
legislatures had sought a source of guidance on how to construct and limit
criminal law coherently, they would have had relatively few sources to
which to turn.
of strict-liability federal crimes). See generally APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY (A.P. Simester ed.,
2005).
5. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 1 (1989).
6. LUCIA ZEDNER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 39 (2004).
7. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,
508(2001).
8. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCi. 157 (1967); see also SANFORD H. KADISH, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 40 (1987).
9. Glanville Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 107, 123 (1955).
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Into this morass steps Douglas Husak,' ° a leading philosopher of crimi-
nal law, with what now probably stands as the most ambitious effort to
defend workable normative parameters for criminalization-the baseline
from which "overcriminalization" can be measured-and to offer a coherent
approach, built on familiar doctrinal terms, for courts and legislatures to
employ in defining and revising criminal law. Building on his years of scho-
larly work on related issues, Husak's book Overcriminalization sketches the
components of a theory for defining the limits of what sorts of conduct
should or should not be subject to criminal punishment. Remarkably, this
sort of theory is nearly nonexistent as a matter of common or constitutional
law, and even as a theory designed as a policy proposal it has few peers. For
the importance and difficulty of the topic alone, as well as the skill with
which it is developed, Husak's book is a significant contribution.
Still, it is not clear Husak's effort is a promising one, as a practical mat-
ter, to ameliorate the incoherence of crime definition, a point even Husak
might concede. Although he builds his theory in part on judicially created
constitutional doctrine, Husak offers his thesis foremost as guidance to leg-
islatures, in hopes they will police their own criminal lawmaking by
adherence to a clarified set of normative commitments, rather than as a the-
ory of judicial review by which courts might more meaningfully limit
criminal lawmaking (p. 131). This is an interesting choice, one that departs
from other (less developed) proposals for addressing overcriminalization."
It is worth exploring why one would make this choice, given the seemingly
dim prospects for legislative self-constraint on crime creation. I will develop
one view, in Part II, which suggests that such constraint is only realistically
possible with institutional changes in the legislative process. Legislatures'
problems are not so much that principles that should limit criminal law lack
clarity, but that their institutional structure typically makes principled rather
than majoritarian 2 action unlikely. But institutional change is not the only
premise for hope of better prospects for legislative reform of criminal law,
as I explore below. Democratic politics holds more promise for contraction
of criminal law than many, including Husak, imply. Interestingly, that is
because some of the terms of Husak's theory of criminalization are already
familiar terms of argument in popular criminal law debates. Nonetheless,
despite some promise for legislative progress, other questions remain: why
have courts not stepped in to limit crime definition constitutionally, and why
shouldn't they?
10. Professor of Philosophy, University of Rutgers.
11. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 7, at 587-96 (arguing that "[t]he last, and probably best,
solution is to increase judicial power over criminal law" through such constitutional doctrines as
notice, desuetude, and proportionate sentencing). "[Tiwo changes are needed: a change in constitu-
tional law, to grant judges the power to undo too-harsh sentencing decisions by legislatures and
prosecutors, and a change in judicial culture, so that judges will exercise that power once they have
it." Id. at 596.
12. I neglect here for the sake of brevity accounts of legislative decision making that de-
scribe nonmajoritarian outcomes. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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In Part III, I will offer a hypothesis about why Husak, unfortunately,
probably correctly estimates the minimal role courts could play in address-
ing the problem of overcriminalization-at least, the problems of
overcriminalization that Husak is most concerned about, which means
crimes that still lack substantial popular opposition. Husak, to his credit,
picks no low-hanging fruit; his focus is on the most difficult arguments of
excessive criminalization, especially drug crimes. The nature of those of-
fenses tells us something about why courts are unlikely agents to restrain
them, and also about the role of normative theory in constitutional law and
political change. In short, courts are less likely to strike down criminal laws
without indicia of popular and legislative support for such moves. But when
that support exists, legislatures eventually do much of the decriminalization
work themselves, reducing the need for judicial intervention. There are,
however, pieces of the overcriminalization puzzle that are less amenable to
democratic attention than others, and in those instances, courts might plau-
sibly play a more active role even without first taking signals from
legislative innovations. Part IV assesses how much a remedy for overcrimi-
nalization might affect the related but separate problem of excessive
incarceration.
I. HUSAK'S THESIS
Much of the literature lamenting overcriminalization cites a range of
seemingly silly crimes as examples: the crime of using the "Smokey Bear"
image without authorization, disturbing mud in a federal cave, or, more se-
riously, adult consensual-sex offenses. 3 Others cite statutes that bar
potentially more harmful conduct, such as deceptive commercial practices,
that nonetheless seem dubious as crimes either because the offenses are de-
fined as strict liability14 or because they address activity that seems more
plausibly (and often is actually) regulated by civil or administrative law. 5
Husak acknowledges these crimes are examples of overcriminalization but
spends little time on them because they are rarely enforced. He focuses in-
stead on "laws that actually are enforced with some degree of regularity"
and thereby contribute to excessive punishment (p. 35). Again, his focus is
on more difficult claims of overcriminalization, primarily drug crimes.
Drug crimes are important because, unlike these foregoing examples,
they actually account for a sizeable portion of federal and state convictions
and are the basis for a significant percentage of incarcerated offenders who
13. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 4302(1), 4302(5), 4306(a)(1), 4306(b) (2006) (making it an offense to
disturb a cave); 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2006) (criminalizing unauthorized use of the "Smokey Bear"
name); Sara Sun Beale, Essay, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 761 (2005); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. REv. 703, 704 (2005).
14. See pp. 20-21 (noting recent statutes that enlarge the scope of criminalization by impos-
ing strict liability).
15. For a random example, see 7 U.S.C. § 195 (2006) (felony for livestock producers' failure
to obey order from Secretary of Agriculture). For a partial list, see BAKER, supra note 4.
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make up by far the largest population of prisoners in the industrialized world
or in American history. The more common, colorful examples of over-
criminalization would be worrisome if they were ever enforced, but they
rarely are (and adult consensual-sex offenses are now mostly repealed and
likely unconstitutional).17 But if drug crimes were abolished as improper
uses of criminalization, the criminal-justice system would change dramati-
cally. Husak's other concerns are equally at the center of contemporary
criminal practice: broad conspiracy doctrines, various crimes of risk preven-
tion, strict liability offenses (particularly drug-related homicide offenses),
and "ancillary" offenses, which criminalize relatively innocuous conduct
(such as money laundering or failure to report knowledge of felonies) that is
facilitative of other, uncontroversial crimes (p. 20). These are tough cases.
These crimes do not address silly or petty activity or unenforced statutes.
They have significant support among prosecutors, legislators, and the pub-
lic. To have effect in reducing these sorts of offenses, a normative theory of
criminalization must do one of two things: convince courts to limit legisla-
tures' criminal law policy preferences that have significant public support,
or change minds-among legislators and the public-about the wisdom and
appeal of such offenses. Either task is a tall order. There is, however, histori-
cal precedent for both. I consider that history briefly in Section II.A, 8 but
first we should look at the content of Husak's argument that seeks to do this
persuasive work.
The components of Husak's argument are not only sensible but to a
large degree familiar. Much of what Husak seeks to do is make criminal law
live up to the traditional, defining characteristics-such as harm and wrong-
fulness-that we use, somewhat inaccurately, to describe criminal law
generally. Husak argues for two sets of constraints on criminal law: internal
constraints, arising from the traditional conception of criminal law itself;
and external constraints, which he takes largely from familiar constitutional
law doctrine, which is to say, ultimately, from a thesis of the proper limits of
state power.
Husak's first set of internal constraints is indeed familiar. Criminal stat-
utes should address only nontrivial harms or evils, should criminalize only
wrongful conduct (pp. 55, 65-67), and should impose punishment only on
offenders who deserve it, in proportion with their desert (pp. 55, 82-83).
Giving content to any of those notions, however, as Husak concedes, is
fraught with difficulty. A prominent definition of harm, for instance, is a
16. For worldwide data on incarceration rates, see Int'l Centre for Prison Studies, World
Prison Brief, http://www.kcI.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/ (last modified Feb. 4, 2008)
(ranking the United States as having the highest incarceration rate in the world at 760 per 100,000
population and relying on U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics data). For historical data back to 1971
showing the rise in American incarceration rates by state, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS- 1985, at 532 tbl.6.30 (Timothy
J. Flanagan & Edmund E McGarrell eds., 1986).
17. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
18. See infra Part H; text accompanying notes 37-42.
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wrongful setback of others' legitimate interests.' 9 But that definition requires
theories of wrongful conduct and of moral rights or some other source to
define cognizable interests. And wrongfulness is grounded ultimately in
shared, specific intuitions about what conduct is wrongful. Given the con-
tentious debates about the wrongfulness of many sorts of activities, that is a
judgment for which courts are often ill suited until widely shared social
views emerge, and that is thus best left to legislatures. But, as we will see,
Husak is uncomfortable leaving judgments about wrongfulness to majori-
tarian views, which presents us with the difficult prospect of hoping
legislatures will sort valid, shared intuitions about wrongfulness from ma-
joritarian judgments about the same.
The final internal constraint takes a different form. From the long-
standing premise that criminal law requires special justification because it
imposes distinctive penalties-penalties characterized by hard treatment and
censure-Husak posits a presumptive right not to be punished (pp. 55, 92-
100). That right is built on an implicit account of the state, a topic to which
Husak concedes he gives limited attention (p. 120). A liberal state, on this
view, needs good reasons to impose hard treatment and censure on citizens
and thereby infringe fundamental liberty interests. Those reasons come from
properly constructed criminal laws, defined in terms of harm, wrongfulness,
and desert, components that limit state power as well as provide notice and
embody fairness. By culpably committing harmful wrongdoing, one's right
not to be punished is overridden by the state's justified power to punish (pp.
96-98). But for the project of constraining decisions about criminalization,
Husak infers from the right not to be punished a burden of proof on those
who propose new criminal prohibitions (p. 100). Punishment requires spe-
cial justification, and that justification must come from a set of reasons
beyond merely majoritarian preferences-reasons found in the harm,
wrongfulness, and desert requirements.20
Positing a limited right not to be punished provides Husak with an anal-
ogy to doctrines that protect other constitutional rights, on which he builds
the remaining constraints of his account, which are not implicit in traditional
criminal law but are grounded instead in views of personal liberty and state
power in liberal democracies. If we accept the right not to be punished as
important but not fundamental-a familiar constitutional law distinction-
that points naturally to the constitutional doctrine of intermediate scrutiny as
a framework for regulating criminal law." A legislature could criminalize
19. See p. 71 (discussing I JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 34, 144 (1984)).
20. Pp. 102-03 ("[J]udgments about overcriminalization are normative and presuppose a
baseline.... [T]he preferences of the majority as expressed through democratic procedures should
not be used to identify this baseline.").
21. Fundamental interests are protected by strict scrutiny, a level of review that commonly
overturns state attempts at regulation, which Husak labels "too radical" because it "might come
close to obliterating the criminal law altogether." See pp. 126-27. It is too radical, in fact, because it
entails a great infringement on legislative decision making, when the criminal-law context is one in
which legislatures have always had wide leeway; hence the odds of courts stepping in under the
guise of any doctrine to obliterate criminal law are nil.
[Vol. 108:971
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activity only if the government interest in doing so is substantial, the prohi-
bition directly advances that government interest, and the government's
objective is no more extensive than necessary to achieve its purpose (pp.
128, 132). Again, these components are borrowed from a familiar constitu-
tional doctrine of judicial review. American courts have experience applying
22these limits in contexts such as gender discrimination. But Husak con
cludes that courts are not institutionally competent to make the substantive
judgments this doctrine requires in the context of criminal law-judgments
on "whether noncriminal approaches to given problems are less restrictive
than criminal solutions, whether particular kinds of conduct merit condem-
nation, whether statutes serve important expressive functions, whether given
coordination problems are important and require state action, and the like"
(pp. 130-31). He may well be right about that, in part because of the diffi-
culty of giving specificity to his initial set of constraints, i.e., what counts as
harm or as wrongdoing.
That leaves his proposal as a set of principles legislatures should volun-
tarily abide by, a prospect, Husak concedes, that "[p]erhaps" means a theory
of criminalization "is unlikely to achieve anything of practical significance
in the real world" (p. 131). In that case, his account serves "as a powerful
tool of criticism among scholars and citizens alike" (p. 131). A theory of
criminalization, in other words, is most likely to have effect as a basis for
persuasive argument in scholarly and public debate and thereby eventually
democratic processes, and in this way it might eventually help influence
legislatures by shifting public and elite opinion.
This is an interesting observation-one might say concession-for
Husak. On the one hand, he recognizes that, to limit the process of crimi-
nalization that has always (since legislatures took over crime definition from
common-law judges) been handled by legislatures with relatively few limits
from courts, we need something other than legislatures acting in accord with
democratic preferences. "[T]he preferences of the majority as expressed
through democratic procedures should not be used to identify [the] baseline"
by which we determine whether criminalization is overcriminalization, be-
cause majorities may well endorse criminalization that is excessive by some
normative criteria, as is probably the situation with respect to drug crimes to
which Husak objects (p. 102). If there is a difference between what the gov-
ernment can regulate and what it can criminally punish people for, "we
should be less persuaded by the familiar democratic rationale for vesting
broad authority in legislatures to enact criminal laws.... [A] demanding
test of justification must be applied to all penal legislation" (pp. 102-03).
22. Husak references the origins of this judicial doctrine primarily from commercial-speech
cases such as Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). P. 128 n.30. But this approach to intermediate scrutiny has also been developed in a line of
gender-bias cases under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). For a brief discussion of this gender
equality doctrine, see GOODWIN LiU ET AL., AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY,




Husak, in other words, wants legislatures to act in accord with principle
rather than majoritarian will when it comes to criminal law; he wants legis-
latures to act less like legislatures and more like (our ideal version of)
courts. Legislatures, not courts, should apply the "demanding test of justifi-
cation" to their own legislative products.
I. LEGISLATURES AND CRIME DEFINITION
How can one expect legislatures to abide by a set of commitments that
require rejection of democratic preferences? Husak does not address theo-
ries of legislative action and institutional design. That is not to be faulted.
His focus is primarily the philosopher's task of contributing new arguments
to a normative debate. But it is worth considering how such a normative
account might have some effect within existing institutional arrangements.
There are models of legislative action that describe legislatures as doing
something other than directly translating majoritarian preferences into pol-
icy. We might divide those models roughly into two categories. The first,
represented by much of public-choice analysis, posits that sometimes there
is no coherent majority preference among multiple options, and that voting
and other procedural rules, along with legislative practices such as log roll-
ing, affect outcomes generally and frequently produce nonmajoritarian
outcomes in particular.2' The second source of nonmajoritarian features are
the sort described in the Federalist Papers 10 and 51: deliberate efforts to
moderate majoritarian outcomes through structural choices such as separa-
tion of powers, and government through elected representatives rather than
direct democracy.4 Features of legislative process described in contempo-
rary literature, such as the range of "vetogate" mechanisms like committee
power within legislatures, further explains means to limit majority prefer-
25ences.
The first model is a largely descriptive one but pessimistic in its implica-
tions; it suggests the difficulty (at best) of designing legislatures to
consistently achieve majoritarian outcomes. The second, more affirmative
vision of nonmajoritarianism posits good reasons for limiting populist out-
comes and endorses countervailing influences of, for instance, interest-
group competition and public-minded reason. Both are relevant to a thesis
about how legislative design affects criminal law, but the second should be
more important. The first suggests that some criminal statutes, like all cate-
23. For an overview, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291-92 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). The
paper argues in part that we can guard against governmental oppression "by a division of the gov-
ernment into distinct and separate departments" and against oppression by "a majority... united by
a common interest ... by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as
will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable."
Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
25. Vetogates refer to opportunities for legislators to kill a bill without formally voting on it.
E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70 (2d ed.
2006).
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gories of legislative products, may not reflect majority preferences and, in-
deed, that coherent majority preferences may not exist on some policy
options. With respect to some statutes, that undermines the general view that
criminal law's dysfunction is largely a function of populist politics. On the
other hand, the first model could help explain, to some degree, the discon-
nect between some criminal justice policies and survey data on public
preferences regarding specific policies, which often document more moder-
ate views than criminal law and punishment policy reflect.2 6 The second
model, however, lends legitimacy and a long pedigree to strategies to mod-
erate populist pressures on criminal lawmaking through structural or
procedural changes in legislative process. The Constitution's drafters con-
sciously and extensively sought to hinder quick government action based on
majoritarian preferences (or passions) through a range of features including
separation of powers and indirect election of the president and senators.
Contemporary analogues, such as using commissions to structure legislative
proposals," work on the same premise that normatively preferable outcomes
can be achieved by institutional designs that limit direct popular influence.
Such questions of how to maximize the practical prospects for achieving
his goals is not Husak's focus. But the tension between the goals of his the-
ory and his proposal for its achievement nonetheless suggests an
equivocation on the feasibility of any criminalization theory. It is con-
structed like a doctrine that courts apply, but it is one he suspects courts are
unlikely (and perhaps incompetent) to adopt. It is nominally directed at
legislatures, but it amounts to a directive that they should not act in the
manner in which they are mostly designed to act, viz., in accord with ma-
joritarian preferences. That dilemma is not unique to Husak's theory; it is
the central reason that explains why the problem he tackles is so intractable,
and why we have never had a rigorous limitation on criminal-law creation.
Courts cannot do it, and legislatures cannot either.
Unless, perhaps, those institutions change, and do so fairly substantially.
For criminalization theory to gain some influence in legislatures, we need
those bodies to adopt the sort of agenda-setting mechanisms that temper
majoritarian pressures-and some minority pressures, including prosecutor
lobbying for expansive criminalization -that are familiar mechanisms with
regard to a wide range of other legislative topics. Elizabeth Garrett has given
much attention to "framework legislation" adopted by Congress on a variety
of policy topics to structure its decision making in ways that reduce the like-
lihood of some legislative outcomes and increase the odds of others by, for
26. See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & MjKE HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005); JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION:
LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 21-34 (2003); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
27. For a discussion of some of the mechanisms regulating legislation on the federal budget,
trade, and military-base closures, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 723-28 (2005).
28. For a prominent argument on the power of prosecutors as lobbyists on criminal-justice
issues, see Stuntz, supra note 7.
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example, insulating bill drafters from partisan pressure, reducing the role of
committees, and limiting amendment possibilities. 2  Rules governing the
budget process, 3° congressional decisions to close military bases (which as-
signed initial choices to an independent commission and limited Congress's
authority to change those decisions)," and "fast-track" trade legislation that
curtails Congress's involvement in trade agreements negotiated by presi-
dents are some examples." Use of the United States Sentencing
Commission to redesign federal sentencing policy is another, less successful
attempt to "depoliticize" hot-button policy making; it was created with just
these sorts of goals in mind.33 Minnesota's sentencing commission, on the
other hand, was much more successful at contributing to the state's moder-
ate incarceration policy.34
To improve the quality of criminal lawmaking, recent and existing mod-
els suggest a practice of originating crime bills in a specialized commission
of the legislature-a state-crime or law-reform commission. The American
Law Institute once served an equivalent function when it presented the
Model Penal Code ("MPC") to states, which set the agenda for a decade-
plus of criminal-code reform. Most states altered some MPC provisions and
rejected portions of the proposal, but use of the MPC as a starting point
nonetheless shaped legislative criminal lawmaking for the better, though
only for a time. To sustain a thoughtful, moderate criminal lawmaking proc-
ess, legislatures need institutional structures like crime commissions, and
perhaps statutory statements defining a substantive account of criminal
law-much like Husak's criteria-against which crime proposals should be
measured.35
Legislative structures of this sort may or may not be enough to turn leg-
islatures from their long-standing tendency toward expansive criminal law.
But there is a longer track record for hope on this front than is often recog-
nized. American legislatures in fact have long traditions of
decriminalization, mostly on the sorts of conduct that majorities eventually
came to have some sympathy with deregulating. The list is substantial: leg-
islatures led the way in decriminalizing adult consensual sex; distribution of
contraception; many gambling offenses; alcohol prohibition; certain firearm
crimes; and varieties of offenses of expressive conduct including cross-
29. Garrett, supra note 27.
30. Id. at 723-24.
31. Id. at 725-26 (discussing the Base Realignment and Closure Act).
32. Id. at 727-28.
33. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 717-18 (2005)
(describing a legislator's hopes that the commission will reduce the risk of Congress "politicizing
the entire sentencing issue" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 757 ("[T]he U.S. Sentencing
Commission is universally recognized to be an ineffectual agency that has done little to change the
tough-on-crime politics of sentencing at the federal level.").
34. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CfuME &
JUST. 131 (2005).
35. For further thoughts on this idea, see Darryl Brown, History's Challenge to Criminal
Law Theory, 3 CRIM. L. & PHILOSOPHY 271 (2009).
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dressing, distributing sexually explicit literature, public war-policy criticism,
and contraception deregulation (as well as mere advocacy of deregulation).36
Recently, two legislatures, New Jersey and New Mexico, repealed the death
penalty (a reform several states took in the mid-nineteenth century). The law
reform commission model has succeeded in aiding repeal of lower visibility
crimes. Such commissions in Virginia" and New Jersey," for example, in
recent years have been used by legislatures to prompt repeal of little-used
criminal statutes. Much the same is true with respect to some important
criminal-procedure rights. Some legislatures enacted statutory exclusion
rules as remedies for illegal searches before the Supreme Court required that
remedy for states as a matter of constitutional law, and legislatures have
funded access to DNA analysis for innocence claims, banned racial profiling
in police investigations, protected various forms of suspect privacy, and
regulated wiretapping and coercive interrogation techniques; forty-five
states granted right to counsel by statute by the time of Gideon v. Wain-
wright.39
Much of this track record of decriminalization and regulation might be
described as largely reflecting changed majoritarian preferences. But if so, it
suggests majoritarian preferences, and legislatures, are capable of moving in
favor of more limited criminal law (and a less intrusive criminal
enforcement process). Still, what legislatures have been less inclined to do is
lead rather than follow public opinion on decriminalization of the sort of
difficult cases Husak focuses on: drug crimes; broad conspiracy doctrines;
harsh sentences on many crimes; and a wide range of broad, preemptive
offensives that expand criminal liability beyond crimes that even arguably fit
criminalization criteria such as Husak's. Unless institutional-design features
can prompt legislatures to move from this criminalization pattern, it seems
unlikely we can hope for legislatures to address the most difficult examples
of expansive criminalization, at least anytime soon. On the other hand,
popular support for reform even of drug-crime policy is not inconceivable.
Budget pressures and limits on prison capacity have lately prompted some
consideration of further decriminalizing (and then taxing) marijuana, 40 and
decriminalization of medical marijuana has won support through popular
36. For a discussion of these decriminalization histories and a list of sources, see Darryl K.
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEx. L. REV. 223, 235-41 (2007).
37. See id. at 243 n.100.
38. See id. at 251 n.136.
39. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For discussion of these trends and citations to sources, see Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution,
102 MIcH. L. REV. 801, 839-50 (2004) (recounting history of congressional regulation of wiretapping);
Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1361 (2004) (arguing that legislative trends
through the Warren Court era suggest that the Court's criminal-procedure decisions can be fairly de-
scribed as mostly majoritarian); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 780, 800-04 (2006) (summarizing criminal-procedure legislative developments).
40. David Crary, Bad imes May be Good for Pot Legalization Push, S.F. CHRON., June 21,
2009, at A8; Eric Bailey, Taxing Pot Could Become a Political Toking Point, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 24,
2009, at B 1.
April 20101
Michigan Law Review
referenda in several states.4' Those are modest changes or indicators to be
sure, but in the context of America's history of decriminalization they sug-
gest the possibility for legislative action that moderates drug-crime policy
with the support of, rather than in spite of, public opinion.
III. COURTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND CRIME DEFINITION
Barring that shift in the legislative arena, the next option for reducing
overcriminalization is courts, the institutional player in which Husak places
little hope but other scholars, in particular William Stuntz, have suggested is
a more plausible alternative (if only because, in his view and others, legisla-
tures seem so unlikely to change their ways).42 Stuntz's suggestions for how
courts might take on the regulation of criminal law, while much less devel-
oped than Husak's book-length treatment, are interestingly different in their
doctrinal structure than Husak's approach. I won't explore that contrast here.
Instead, I'll suggest briefly why judicial regulation of criminal law on
Husak's terms might not be as completely implausible as Husak himself
seems to believe.
Despite the familiarity of the basic terms of Husak's account of criminal
law-harm, wrongdoing, desert-the criminal-law theory on which he
builds is, relatively speaking, fairly young, and that youth may explain its
lack of influence in judicially created constitutional law. The influential ar-
ticulation of the harm principle dates at least to John Stuart Mill's 1859
work On Liberty, which prompted a response a few years later from Sir
James Stephen on its implications for criminal law (of which Stephen dis-
approved).43 But Mill's focus wasn't on criminal law per se-he spoke of
government power more generally-and normative criminal law theory re-
mained fairly dormant in building on that argument, or any other, for
roughly a century, during which time scholars mostly wrote treatises 44 rather
than working out strong normative theories of the scope, limits, and ration-
ales of criminal law. That began to change in the mid-twentieth century with
41. See BILL PIPER ET AL., DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, STATE OF THE STATES: DRUG
POLICY REFORMS: 1996-2002, at 42 (2003), available at www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/sos-
report2003.pdf (listing state-law changes on medical marijuana and other drug policies, including
referenda in nine states approving legalization of medical marijuana). For results since 2002, see
Ballotwatch, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ballotwatch.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
42. See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 587-98.
43. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF ESSAYS
162-63 (1873).
44. See, e.g., FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1880); JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (7th ed., rev. and enlarged 1882). But see
FRANCIS WHARTON, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (1880).
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scholars such as Wechsler, Kadish, Hart, and others;45 one manifestation of
that normative work was the MPC.46
Criminal-law theory as a sustained normative account has been under
development for only about fifty years, not necessarily a long time to per-
meate scholarly, popular, and judicial culture. In that time there were
dramatic developments to which normative criminal theory had to respond.
The first was the shift, starting roughly in the 1970s, from the consensus
around a discretionary, nominally rehabilitative sentencing policy that had
dominated practice for several decades to a much harsher regime built on
deterrent and incapacitative rationales, at the same time that retributivist
theories regained ground among scholars and some public officials.47 Those
shifts required a substantial reworking of criminal theory, especially along
lines of revived commitments to desert principles and retributivism rather
than instrumental accounts of punishment. Accompanying that shift (and
preceding it in time by roughly a decade) was the criminal-procedure revo-
lution, which arguably prompted a response in the form of expanded
substantive criminal law;48 if that is so, the need for judicial regulation of
crime was less pressing until recent decades.
At the same time, the Supreme Court developed constitutional doctrinal
tools more generally to regulate legislatures on topics, such as speech, pri-
vacy, and race, that effectively intersected with criminal law, because
legislatures were regulating in such areas with criminal prohibitions. That
meant courts could strike down a lot of criminal statutes without needing a
theory of criminal law; theories of due process, privacy, and speech did most
of the work. Thus fell crimes of certain forms of speech, contraception dis-
tribution, abortion, interracial marriage, and, eventually, consensual adult
sex.
Further, the Court made attempts at regulating substantive criminal law
in other ways, without a theory of criminal law's general normative limits. It
struck down criminal statutes in Papachristou and Kolendar not because the
statutes criminalized nonharmful, nonwrongful conduct (though the statute
in the first case criminalized "habitual loafers" and "strolling around ...
without any lawful purpose," and the second required proof of identification
when one is stopped by a police officer) but because the statutes were va-
guely worded.49 It limited criminal punishment of status in Robinson, which
struck down under the Eighth Amendment a statute making it a crime to "be
45. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); KADiSH, supra note 8;
Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1952); see also
HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31 (1976); Williams, supra note 9.
46. On this point, see George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88
CAL. L. REV. 687 (2000).
47. For a broad overview of the shift toward punitive criminal-sentencing policies in the last
decades of the twentieth century, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2002).
48. William Stuntz developed this thesis. E.g., Stuntz, supra note 39.
49. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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addicted to" narcotics. ° And in Lambert, it struck down a city ordinance
requiring felons to register with police upon arriving in the city, because the
ordinance required no "activity" by offenders, offered no plausible notice of
its requirement, and a breach could be "entirely innocent."'" Those decisions
attempted to regulate criminalization and punishment on due process or
cruel and unusual punishment grounds, rather than on a principle that such
conduct (or nonconduct) was directly protected as a substantive individual
right. Those efforts at indirect regulation, coupled with recognition of sub-
stantive rights to privacy and speech that barred criminalization in those
contexts, may have seemed promising approaches at the time to contain ex-
cessive criminalization. But with the passage of time-and in light of the
growth in crimes and incarceration rates unconstrained by Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine-they are recognized as weak, failed, or abandoned efforts.52
All of that can be understood to provide an explanation for why norma-
tive criminal-law theory has had very little effect on the development of
criminal law to date, and in particular why it effectively has not long been
available as an influence on judicial development of constitutional law.
Normative theory of the sort Husak offers has developed a level of sophisti-
cation only relatively recently, and until fairly recently the Court was likely
to recognize less need for such a theory, in large part because it was attempt-
ing to clean up criminal law with other doctrinal tools, some of which were
very effective (privacy and speech doctrines, for example) and others much
less so (notice and vagueness rules). It is plausible to believe that only in the
last couple of decades has the need for a criminal-law jurisprudence to ac-
company a criminal-procedure jurisprudence become apparent and then (in
the view of many, including Husak and me) pressing.
Husak's account is valuable, then, as an effort to present a careful phi-
losophical account structured as a doctrinal response that courts and lawyers
(and not just philosophers) can understand. Husak is no doubt right that
courts will continue to be reluctant to adopt it as a means to restrict legisla-
tive criminal lawmaking, because the doctrine requires substantive
judgments that intrude some core social-policy strategies. But the more clar-
ity and consensus theorists like Husak achieve, and the greater the need for
such a theory becomes apparent, the better the chances become for criminal
law achieving a constitutional jurisprudence on par with procedure. Odds
still may not be good. Consensus ideas have swept sentencing policy twice
in the last century, but we still lack strong constitutional regulation of pun-
50. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
51. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1957).
52. For a discussion of Lambert in this respect, see Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 107, 127-37. Robinson's failure to extend beyond its facts is
generally recognized to be demonstrated in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (rejecting chal-
lenge to a conviction for public intoxication on grounds that, under Robinson, it punished
defendant's status of being an alcoholic, because "so viewed it is difficult to see any limiting princi-
ple" to Robinson). On the negligible constitutional regulation of sentence proportionality, see Ewing
v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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ishment despite a plausible textual basis for it.53 But stranger things-like
the privacy doctrine, or the constitutionalization of criminal procedure, or
the recent reinvention of the Confrontation Clause and federalism doc-
trines-have happened 4
If the timing is right-overcriminalization is substantial, and other strat-
egies of containment signaled by PapachristoulLambertRobinson proved
inadequate-why might the odds not be good for development of constitu-
tional regulation of criminal law? One explanation would cite originalist or
textualist accounts of constitutional interpretation and find little basis for
limits on legislative definition of criminal law beyond those we have now.
That is certainly true, but such accounts of constitutional law have relatively
little explanatory power for the dramatic changes we have seen in constitu-
tional interpretation, and for the wide acceptance of those changes.
Other accounts describe and endorse an interpretive process in which
courts look not only to the Constitution's text and original meaning but also
to contemporary norms and understandings, and the challenge of contempo-
rary conditions, with the goal that the Constitution's "text and principles
retain their authority and legitimacy over decades and centuries."" De-
scribed as purposive or dynamic interpretation, acceptance of a "living
constitution," or a method of "constitutional fidelity," this approach accepts
that constitutional meaning evolves over time in response to "how courts,
political leaders, and everyday citizens interpret, apply, and adapt our writ-
ten Constitution," even though "the Constitution itself does not change
unless properly amended."56 Constitutional interpretation looks to "the
document's text, history, structure, and purposes, as well as judicial prece-
dent," but also "contemporary social practices, evolving public
understandings of the Constitution's values, and the societal consequences
of any given interpretation. 57
This latter approach has the virtue of explaining the acceptance and le-
gitimacy of big shifts in constitutional meaning, such as the constitutional
regulation of criminal procedure that was, until the 1960s, largely regulated
by state statutes, or contemporary equal-protection doctrines regarding gen-
der and race bias that have little or no grounding in original understandings
of the Civil War amendments." More importantly for present purposes, anapproach such as this raises the possibility of an evolving constitutional
53. The most plausible textual basis is the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause. The absence of significant constitutional regulation of punishment proportionality is
evidenced in Ewing. 538 U.S. at 24-28, 30-31 (upholding sentence under California's "three
strikes" recidivist statute and describing deference to legislative policy choices on sentencing gener-
ally).
54. See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 588-98 (describing the way in which courts could gradually
apply constitutional restrictions to sentencing policy).
55. LU ET AL., supra note 22, at 29.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 33.
58. See, e.g., id. at 47-63.
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understanding that could regulate the scope of substantive criminal law, in
light of contemporary normative commitments and changed circumstances
such as a growing collection of overreaching criminal statutes and Amer-
ica's turn to unprecedented incarceration rates. Husak's ambition for a
theoretical account that informs popular and scholarly debate and thereby
contributes to an emerging vision of criminal law's normative parameters
could aid this shift in understanding.
But if criminalization theory achieves this kind of success, notice that it
would not be in the way Husak foresees-a normative principle that stands
against popular opinion in favor of more criminal law. A theory that success-
fully informs scholarly and popular discussion eventually shifts views, so
that popular (and scholarly or "opinion-maker") opinion and moral intuition
will no longer contrast so sharply with the principles Husak endorses. Dy-
namic constitutionalism recognizes that courts are in constant implicit
dialogue with the political branches. The Supreme Court sometimes ex-
plains its decisions with recognition of explicit legislative signals about
changed constitutional meaning, such as citing trends among legislatures in
decriminalizing certain conduct or removing juveniles from death penalty
eligibility. Or, it may recognize other signs of evolving norms and public
values, such as civil rights legislation that is both Congress's attempt to give
meaning to the substance of the Civil War amendments and an example of
public values that affect how the Court will interpret those provisions.
If all of this is correct, notice the difficulty it presents for a constitu-
tional jurisprudence that would bar, say, some drug laws.59 On the one
hand, we have clear records of democratic politics reducing overcriminali-
zation in light of changed social mores. Legislatures responded to
democratic pressures to repeal a wide variety of long-standing crimes,
such as consensual-sex offenses. When (and mostly only when) those leg-
islative trends are clear, the Court is willing to step in and impose, as a
matter of constitutional law, the view of national majorities on outlier ju-
risdictions, as it did in, for instance, Lawrence v. Texas 60 and, earlier,
61Loving v. Virginia. On the other hand, our democratic indicators that drug
crimes are losing public favor are more modest and tentative, and we have
little indication that drug crimes are viewed as clashing with constitutional
values in the way that race and gender discrimination came to be so viewed,
or statutes criminalizing speech, contraception, or private consensual sex.
Despite some trend toward medical-marijuana decriminalization and some
59. Husak cites the surprising enforcement records regarding even simple drug-possession
crimes. P. 16.
60. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a statute criminalizing homosexual sod-
omy).
61. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a statute criminalizing interracial marriage).
For different descriptions of courts, especially the Supreme Court, devising doctrine in light of
broader social change, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitu-
tional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2004); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices,
and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 927 (2006); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change,
and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
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moderation of certain drug-crime punishments, drug crimes as a whole con-
tinue to be regularly enforced (though enforcement patterns, especially with
regard to marijuana possession, vary widely between localities), and there is
so far insufficient indication that policy makers are moving significantly
toward decriminalization and toward a harm-reduction or public-health
strategy, rather than law-enforcement strategy, for addressing drug use and
drug markets. Without those sorts of democratic indicators to support if not
lead a changed understanding of constitutional meaning regarding criminal
law's proper scope, it is unlikely courts will move in that direction. There is
more to be said here, to be sure, than is summarized in this briefest of
sketches of constitutional interpretation; courts do act in antimajoritarian
ways at times. Still, originalist approaches provide no support for such a
move, and dynamic or fidelity approaches, dependent on courts taking sig-
nals from democratic branches, would not likely predict or recommend it
either.
Normative criminal-law theory is a contribution toward a shift in under-
standing, but normative theory seems rarely to have much influence directly
on courts' decision making absent its influence first on at least elite profes-
sional opinion, if not popular opinion. -Husak's agenda, especially in as
much as it is directed to legislatures and public critics, is an explicit effort to
influence the project of democratic meaning making. In that sense, his em-
phasis on speaking to legislatures and scholars rather than courts is a
plausible one.
But note the difference in how Husak aims to achieve limits on criminal
law's reach and how existing limits have largely been achieved in the past.
Husak seeks to limit criminal law as a category; any law imposing criminal
punishments should accord with the prerequisites of wrongdoing, harmful-
ness, significant government interest, and the like. To reject a particular drug
crime or other offense, we determine that it lacks one of these components.
But the historical successes of criminal-law reform have not been framed in
quite these terms, although interestingly, they implicitly employ some of
them. More typically, social movements and eventually democratic branches
of government focus on a particular criminalized activity (interracial mar-
riage, consensual adult sex) and build arguments in favor of liberty
regarding that particular activity. Often, the arguments resonate with
Husak's familiar criteria. Regarding private consensual gay sex, for exam-
ple, they took the form that such conduct is not harmful or wrongful and the
government thus has no significant interest in regulating it.63 For long peri-ods, those arguments failed because many people thought nonmarital sex
62. One might explain originalism's influence in this way: that method is one some Supreme
Court Justices such as Justice Scalia explicitly endorse, but that approach won wide acceptance in
circles of conservative elites at a time when conservative politics was ascendant. See, e.g., McCreary
County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 896-99 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Constitution's meaning should be determined by how the Founding generation would have applied
it); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861-62 (1989) (similar).
63. For the definitive history of sodomy-law reform, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DIs-
HONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003 (2008).
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threatened families and community order or spread disease or other harms.
Eventually, as views changed, they became persuasive. But successful
movements tend to start not with a focus on the proper parameters of crimi-
nal law generally but on the particular criminalized activity. Yet in the
history of many successful decriminalization movements, we find arguments
partially in Husak's terms: arguments that gun possession, consensual sex,
interracial marriage, or alcohol use is not wrongful or harmful. 64 There are
strong arguments that not all existing crimes address wrongful and harmful
conduct. Yet wrongfulness and harmfulness are familiar terms we turn to in
democratic debate over whether a given activity should be criminalized. To
that extent, Husak already has a partial victory.
If that is so, why does overcriminalization remain, especially with re-
spect to drug crimes? It may be that other components of Husak's argument
that have less resonance in public debate-the limitation of significant gov-
ernment interests, and the presumptive right not to be punished-are
necessary to do the further reform work Husak would like to see. More like-
ly, I suspect, it is that remaining examples of excessive criminalization fall
into two categories: offenses, such as drug crimes, that are amenable to de-
mocratic reform, and second, other sorts of crimes that are unlikely to be the
object of social-reform movements and thus may require a harder, or at least
different, route for reform. Substantial repeal or revision of drug laws may
be no more implausible than repeal of homosexual sodomy laws once was;
we have noted some modest changes in that direction, and groups such as
the Drug Policy Alliance Network actively lobby for repeal and reform.
Some polling data suggest substantial support for less criminalization and
less incarceration regarding drugs.66 Perhaps drug policy is simply a couple
of decades behind, say, sodomy-law reform and harsh drug prohibition will
last a few decades longer than alcohol prohibition did. Whatever the even-
tual outcome, drug crime and punishment is a topic of ongoing public
debate-on the familiar terms of harmfulness and wrongfulness-of the sort
that has led in the past to legislative decriminalization.
Other examples of overcriminalization to which Husak also gives some
attention, however, seem in a different category that is much less likely to be
the focus of successful political movements. Much overcriminalization, as
noted earlier with regard to overlapping crimes, takes the form of offenses
that punish functionally the same conduct-the same harmful, wrongful
64. Advocates tend to argue against all regulation of the conduct, civil or criminal, rather
than starting with the category of criminal law and asking whether this activity justifies overcoming
one's right not to be punished. That may be why we have very little distinction, as a matter of con-
stitutional law, of the sort Husak argues for between what the government can criminalize and what
the government can regulate. There are a few exceptions. Nascent arguments for marijuana legaliza-
tion tend to endorse civil regulation along the lines of tobacco control.
65. For a description of Drug Policy Alliance Network efforts, including involvement in
partial repeal of harsh sentencing laws for drug offenders in New York state, see Drug Policy Alli-
ance Network, http://www.drugpolicy.org/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).
66. For a summary of recent polls on these issues, see Drug Policy Alliance,
Rockefeller Drug Laws: Quick Facts 2, Feb. 2009, http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/
RockefellerDrugLawQuickFacts.pdf.
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conduct-in multiple ways, meaning to an excessive degree. Broad interpre-
tations of federal fraud statutes are one set of examples; 61 the Pinkerton
61
conspiracy doctrine is another. Particular applications of these offenses
regard behavior that is wrongful only in a marginal, ambiguous, or attenu-
ated sense, and perhaps a high-profile case could prompt some public
attention to reform. But most such examples of expansive criminal liability
are under the radar of significant democratic monitoring and, perhaps more
importantly, are often connected to unambiguously wrongful behavior, 69as
in the conspiracy context.
What is worrisome about these examples of excessive criminalization is
that neither democratic actor is likely to push for their revision-for they
don't have the symbolic meaning or widespread reach into people's lives
that sex or gun statutes do-and courts seem unlikely to either. Courts, after
all, created some of the excessive reach of these provisions through statutory
interpretation; the Supreme Court, of course, devised the Pinkerton doctrine.
With regard to these latter sorts of offenses, we need either courts to inter-
nalize some commitment to criminal law's parameters like Husak's
arguments, or reformed institutional arrangements in legislatures to help put
such items on the agenda despite an absence of public lobbying. While
courts show little sign of either shift now, change is not as implausible as it
may seem. Precisely because democratic monitoring pays less attention to
this sort of criminalization, courts, by imposing some limits on
criminalization, would not contravene notable democratic preferences (the
way it would in holding drug crimes unconstitutional) and legislatures might
find less popular resistance to reform. In the latter case, however, the likely
resistance of prosecutors may be an insuperable barrier. But this context is
in fact where courts are most suited-acting to refine law in accord with
core normative commitments of the sort Husak describes, in a process that
looks like common lawmaking, in a context in which democratic govern-
ance pays little attention.
IV. OVERCRIMINALIZATION AND OVERPUNISHMENT
Husak's theory is an appealing and sound one as far as it goes, even if
we have uncertain hopes of either courts or legislatures acting in accord with
such a vigorous theory of criminalization. But perhaps the current absence
67. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS EN-
FORCEMENT 160-236 (4th ed. 2006) (overview of federal fraud statutes); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Modem Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. C~iM. L. REV. 427,
463 (1998) (arguing mail-fraud statute is excessively broad especially as to private fiduciaries); Jed
S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980) (describing the
mail fraud statute's appeal to federal prosecutors for, inter alia, its "simplicity" and "adaptability").
68. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (holding conspirators liable for
coconspirators' crimes in furtherance of the conspiracy even if the conspirators did not agree to
those crimes).
69. This behavior is arguably nonculpable, however, because the conspirator may have had
no knowledge of, and did not approve of, his coconspirator's additional criminal acts for which he
faces liability under Pinkerton.
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of such a theory is not as critical to the biggest underlying problem of
criminal justice as Husak suggests. Husak believes that the most important
problems in criminal justice today are "expansion in the substantive criminal
law and the extraordinary rise in the use of punishment" (p. 3). He sees the
first as a cause of the second: "I argue that overcriminalization is objection-
able mainly because it produces too much punishment., 70 Our punishment
practices are unjust, he argues, not simply because we punish excessively
with regard to widely accepted crimes-though he seems to agree with that
argument as well-but because punishments "are inflicted for conduct that
should not have been criminalized at all" (p. 3).
Because much of America's contemporary policy of extreme punish-
ment arises from sentencing to relatively noncontroversial crimes, it is not
clear how much a reduction of overcriminalization would affect the problem
of overpunishment. Clearly if a substantial range of drug offenses were
eliminated, incarceration rates would notably drop. Beyond drug offenses,
however, there is a strong argument that the biggest cause of overpunish-
ment is, simply, overpunishment-excessive sentences that far exceed
international punishment rates or the American punishment averages for
most of the twentieth century, even for familiar violent crimes.
A contributor to that overpunishment practice-one that Husak recog-
nizes-is the probable growth ("probable" because the development is hard
to measure accurately) of redundant or overlapping crimes, which increase
liability and punishment for effectively the same conduct (pp. 22, 36-37).
But Husak's theory may not do as much to control redundant offenses that
criminalize wrongful conduct as it would to mitigate criminalization of
nonwrongful, nonharmful conduct. His requirements that criminal law ac-
cord with offender desert," coupled with his requirement that offenses be no
more extensive than necessary to directly serve the government's substantial• 72
interest, should provide the basis for limiting excessive punishment,
whether arising from the sentence assigned to a single offense or arising
from the accumulation of multiple, overlapping offenses. But, as to legisla-
tures, at least, notions of desert and necessity regarding punishment have not
in recent decades been restrictive ideas; they are as easily turned into ration-
ales for our prevailing excessive sentences. 3 What little moderation we have
70. P. 3; see also pp. 14-15. But see p. 18 ("I do not allege that the growth of the criminal
law is the only or even the most significant factor in explaining the increased size of the prison
population. The most important reason . .. is because punishments for existing offenses have be-
come far more severe.").
71. Pp. 82-83 ("[Plunishments may be undeserved when they are excessive. The desert
constraint underlies the principle of proportionality .....
72. See pp. 153-59.
73. See James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 85 (2003).
Again, however, there are exceptions. Minnesota's legislature created a sentencing commission and
regime that has successfully moderated incarceration policies. See Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines, available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/ (noting guidelines took effect in 1980);
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.6.29 (2008) (documenting that Minnesota's
incarceration rate per 100,000 residents was less than half the national average rate in 1980 and
remains less than half the national average rate in 2007).
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seen in sentencing from legislatures has come not on grounds of such prin-
ciples but largely in response to budget pressures arising from increased
incarceration coupled with some turn toward treatment over prison for drug
users.
Courts may be a slightly more promising institution to turn to for control
of sentencing. Although the Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence
currently leaves little basis for judicial control of sentences,74 that doctrine,
and related ones of double jeopardy and merger, at least provide more famil-
iar doctrinal premises from which courts could limit sentences arising from
multiple offenses based on the same conduct." But courts will probably
need to conclude that our draconian punishment practices either constitute a
failure of democratic governance that threatens important rights, as they
have to some modest degree in prison-reform litigation, or they will need to
see-as with reform of substantive offenses-some indicators of democratic
support for such a shift.
CONCLUSION
One might argue-or at least, Husak might argue-that it is unfair in as-
sessing this project to focus so much on the practical prospects of achieving
its policy goals. Its primary aim is the philosopher's work of bringing ana-
lytic clarity to a problem and making or improving arguments for its
normative position. Whether and how those arguments affect the world is a
separate issue. On those terms, Husak's work should already be marked a
success. While framed within familiar doctrinal terms, his arguments are
sufficiently persuasive new contributions to the topic to have quickly earned
76favorable notation in prominent theoretical literature. Nonetheless, Husak's
book is a project of applied philosophy focused on a durable problem at the
center of Anglo-American criminal justice. One ultimately wants to know
whether it will change the state of affairs that detrimentally affects scores of
thousands of lives indefinitely into the future. The institutional prospects for
ameliorative change are mixed, but not hopeless. And ideas can matter; they
can have persuasive force that changes widely shared views and actions. If
Husak's book can contribute even modestly to that shift, it would be at least
as great a practical achievement as it is a scholarly one.
74. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitu-
tional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MicH. L. REV. 1145 (2009) (describing and
criticizing the Court's constitutional governance of sentencing).
75. For brief discussions, see Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization:
Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 453, 461-65
(2009), and Stuntz, supra note 7, at 594-96.
76. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 22 (6th ed. 2009).
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